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BACKSTOP, NOT BAILOUT: THE CASE FOR
PRESERVING THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION
AUTHORITY UNDER DODD-FRANK
ABSTRACT
The Trump Administration and Republicans have initiated efforts to
repeal certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), one of which is the Orderly
Liquidation Authority (OLA) under Title II of Dodd-Frank. Critics of the
OLA argue that it enables, rather than prevents, future bailouts funded by
taxpayers. These critics are concerned with the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation’s (FDIC) discretion to decide when and how to resolve
distressed financial firms, as well as the FDIC’s access to large amounts of
funds from the U.S. Department of the Treasury to carry out these
functions. Proponents of the Financial CHOICE Act prefer that instead of a
governmental regulatory body, failing firms be resolved exclusively through
the bankruptcy court system, which they believe provides a fair and
dependable process that protects U.S. consumers by not using taxpayerfunded bailouts. However, this Note will argue that while the bankruptcy
process should be improved upon, the OLA must be preserved to serve as a
fallback and last resort when other resolution regimes fail. The OLA is led
by professional financial experts deeply integrated into the financial
industry who can act quickly and effectively to wind-up failing firms in the
safest manner possible and prevent economic collapse. The OLA also
provides access to critical liquidity necessary for resolving failing firms in
short time frames. A bankruptcy alternative simply cannot provide such
remedies in times of high financial stress because the typical sources of
liquidity in a bankruptcy process, such as creditors and other investors
from the private sector, will also be affected during a crisis and limited in
their ability to provide liquidity to a large failing firm. While improvements
can be made to the OLA, it should not be repealed in its entirety. The OLA
is necessary to protect the economy and prevent the need for another
bailout.
INTRODUCTION
Following the financial crisis of 2008, Congress introduced and passed
into law the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank). 1 Under Title II of Dodd-Frank, Congress created the Orderly
Liquidation Authority (OLA) to provide for the “quick[] and efficient[]
liquida[tion]” of large failing financial institutions to reduce negative
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dodd-frank-financial-regulatory-reform-bill.asp (last visited
Aug. 15, 2018).
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economic impact. 2 Republicans and the Trump Administration have sought
to repeal certain provisions of Dodd-Frank, including the OLA, and replace
it with the Financial CHOICE Act (CHOICE Act). 3 The CHOICE Act
proposes an amendment to the United States (U.S.) Bankruptcy Code to
allow bankruptcy courts to exclusively handle resolutions and liquidations
of large, distressed financial institutions.4 This Note focuses on the purpose
and intention of the OLA and argues for its preservation against repeal.
While amendments to the Bankruptcy Code are encouraged by opponents
and supporters alike, the OLA should remain in place, as it serves a vital
function in the prevention of another financial crisis.5 If other attempts at
resolution fail, the OLA serves as a fallback by providing financial
regulatory expertise, coordination benefits, and crucial liquidity. 6 Despite
criticisms that the OLA enables future government bailouts and provides
too much discretion to government regulators, the OLA allows for the quick
and effective resolution of large, complex financial institutions and shifts
losses to the private sector, thereby preventing taxpayer-funded bailouts. 7
Part I of this Note provides a brief background of the 2008 financial
crisis, a summary of the purpose and function of the OLA, and the
Republican efforts to repeal and replace it with the CHOICE Act. Part II
reviews criticisms of the OLA and how the CHOICE Act hopes to solve
these issues by amending the Bankruptcy Code to exclusively handle the
resolutions of large financial firms. Next, Part III addresses misconceptions
of the OLA’s intent and purpose while highlighting its benefits and
advantages. It also points out potential pitfalls of an exclusively
bankruptcy-based resolution scheme. Finally, Part IV proposes the best
approach going forward, focusing on the strongest aspects of regulatory and
bankruptcy resolution schemes for creating a workable compromise that
addresses current concerns while remaining an effective resolution method
for large financial firms. The Bankruptcy Code must be amended to better
2. Dodd-Frank: Title II - Orderly Liquidation Authority, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank_title_II (last visited Aug. 15, 2018).
3. See Aaron Klein, A Primer on Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority, BROOKINGS
(June 5, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/06/05/a-primer-on-dodd-franksorderly-liquidation-authority.
4. Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon, Richard Paul Richman Professor of Law, Columbia Law
School, and Mark J. Roe, David Berg Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, et. al., to the Hon.
Michael Crapo, Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the
Hon. Jeb Hensarling, Chairman, House Financial Services Committee, et. al., Financial Scholars
Oppose Eliminating “Orderly Liquidation Authority” As Crisis-Avoidance Restructuring
Backstop 3 (May 23, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/
Scholars-Letter-on-OLA-final-for-Congress.pdf.
5. See id.
6. Ben S. Bernanke, Why Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority Should Be Preserved,
BROOKINGS (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2017/02/28/whydodd-franks-orderly-liquidation-authority-should-be-preserved/; see also Gordon & Roe, supra
note 4, at 3.
7. Bernanke, supra note 6.
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handle large failing financial firms; however, the OLA should also be
preserved as an ancillary mechanism to step in if bankruptcy fails.
Maintaining the safety net that is the OLA is crucial to preventing a repeat
of the 2008 financial crisis.
I. THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS, CREATION OF THE OLA, AND
REPUBLICAN REPEAL EFFORTS
A. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS
In 2008, the U.S. economy faced an unprecedented financial crisis.8
The combination of debt and mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) within
financial markets facilitated the crisis.9 Through securitization, the process
of “pooling [] debt and then issuing assets based upon that debt,” financial
institutions restructured payments from U.S. mortgages into products
available for sale to investors in the form of MBSs. 10 As the availability of
new mortgages for securitization decreased, the various firms
“repackag[ed]” the unsellable batches of MBSs and sold them as a new
product called “collateralized debt obligations” (CDOs). 11 These CDOs
appeared to be the same quality investment as previous well-performing
MBSs and were given AAA ratings 12 by credit rating agencies such as
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. 13 Unfortunately, the reality was that the
CDOs were primarily comprised of riskier subprime 14 mortgages. 15 While
added risk typically yields high returns in a normal economic environment,
if the economy is struggling and mortgage defaults are frequent, lenders are

8. Financial Crisis 2008 - Detailed Overview, WALL ST. OASIS, https://www.wallstreetoasis.
com/financial-crisis-overview (last visited Aug. 15, 2018).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. “AAA is the highest possible rating assigned to an issuer’s bonds by credit rating
agencies.” AAA, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/aaa.asp (last visited Aug.
15, 2018). A high credit rating allows issuers to borrow money at a cheaper interest rate, which in
turn gives the issuer a real advantage over competitors by enabling issuers to borrow more money
at any given time to capture potential business opportunities. Id. Many businesses rely on short
term credit to pay operating costs while the business waits for payment on the products it sells.
Credit Crisis, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/credit-crisis.asp (last visited
Aug. 15, 2018). Leading up to the financial crisis, credit rating agencies were favorable in rating
securitized loans such as MBSs and CDOs which were not properly priced to reflect their risk. Id.
When these loans began to default, inter-lending between firms stopped and the financial system
froze. Id.
13. WALL ST. OASIS, supra note 8.
14. A subprime mortgage is a type of loan available to applicants with low credit scores (often
below 600), who could not normally qualify for a traditional mortgage. Shauna Carther, What is a
Subprime Mortgage?, INVESTOPEDIA (updated Dec. 12, 2017, 10:15 AM),
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/07/subprime-mortgage.asp.
15. WALL ST. OASIS, supra note 8.

266

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 13

exposed to large losses. 16 Residential home prices eventually hit their apex,
and a sale or refinance by the owner was insufficient to pay back the
mortgage debt, which in turn forced losses onto lenders and ultimately
threw the entire financial system into crisis. 17 Many major financial
institutions, heavily invested in MBSs were left exposed and suffered
enormous losses, resulting in an inability to meet existing debt
obligations. 18 These large financial conglomerates, dubbed “too big to
fail,” 19 were in “dire financial straits.” 20 Bear Stearns, the fifth-largest U.S.
bank, was forced to merge with JP Morgan, and Lehman Brothers, the
fourth-largest U.S. bank, filed for bankruptcy, making it the largest ever
Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in U.S. history. 21 In the following months, the
U.S. government was forced to preserve the remaining financial institutions
with a bailout. 22 During the crisis, the U.S. government provided failing
firms with over $1.7 trillion in bailout money through its Troubled Asset
Relief Program. 23
B. SUMMARY OF THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY
Believing a government authority was necessary to properly dissolve
large financial institutions and eliminate risk of future government bailouts,
Congress formed the OLA under Title II of Dodd-Frank. 24 The OLA
facilitate the rapid restructuring and stabilization of large faltering financial
firms. 25 The provisions of the OLA include: (i) “Placing a Financial
Company in Receivership”; (ii) “Receiver Duties of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation [(FDIC)]”; (iii) “Claim Priority”; and (iv)
“Elimination of Government Bailouts for Struggling Financial
Institutions.” 26 Upon receiving written recommendation from the FDIC and
the Federal Reserve (Fed), 27 the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
16. John Ogg, CDOs and the Mortgage Market, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 14, 2016, 2:00 PM),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/cdo-mortgages.asp.
17. John V. Duca, Fed. Reserve Bank of Dallas, Subprime Mortgage Crisis, FED. RES. HIST.
(Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/subprime_mortgage_crisis#how.
18. See WALL ST. OASIS, supra note 8.
19. When a firm is “too big to fail,” the firm is so large and so interconnected with other firms
that its failure would have catastrophic sprawling effects throughout the economy. Too Big To
Fail, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/too-big-to-fail.asp (last visited Aug.
16, 2018).
20. LEGAL INFO. INST., supra note 2.
21. See WALL ST. OASIS, supra note 8.
22. A bailout is a situation in which the government injects liquidity into a failing firm to
avoid the ramifications of that firm’s failure. Bailout, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investoped
ia.com/terms/b/bailout.asp (last visited Aug. 16, 2018); see also LEGAL INFO. INST., supra note 2.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. This recommendation must be supported by a vote of two-thirds of the directors of the
FDIC and two-thirds of the members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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with the President, must place a financial company into resolution under the
OLA if the firm is determined to be in danger of default, and its resolution
under bankruptcy law would have serious adverse effects on the financial
stability of the United States. 28 If the board of directors of the distressed
firm acquiesce to the appointment of the FDIC as receiver, the Secretary
will immediately appoint the FDIC as receiver of the distressed firm. 29 If
the distressed firm rejects the appointment, the Secretary must petition the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for an order authorizing the
Secretary to appoint the FDIC as receiver.30 The petition is then filed under
seal and reviewed31 by the district court on a strictly confidential basis. 32
Depending how the district court rules, either the Secretary or the resisting
distressed firm may appeal the district court’s decision to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia no later than thirty days from the date
the decision was rendered, which will consider the appeal on an expedited
basis. 33
As an alternative to bankruptcy, the OLA enables the FDIC to be
appointed as receiver and perform the liquidation and wind-up 34 of the
firm. 35 When a firm is placed into receivership under the OLA, the FDIC
“assumes responsibility for efficiently recovering the maximum amount
possible from the disposition of the receivership’s assets.” 36 The FDIC
Paul L. Lee, Cross-Border Resolution of Banking Groups: International Initiatives and U.S.
Perspectives — Part V, 13 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 395, 418 (2017), https://www.debevoise.
com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2017/11/cross_border_resolutions_of_banking_groups_pa
rt_v.pdf [hereinafter Lee, Cross-Border Resolution].
28. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 203(b)(1)–(7), 124 Stat. 1376, 1451 (2010) (codified in 12 U.S.C. § 5383)
[hereinafter the “Dodd-Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”].
29. Lee, Cross-Border Resolution, supra note 27, at 419. The OLA specifically absolves the
board of director members from liability to shareholders or creditors for acquiescing in good faith
to the appointment of the FDIC as receiver. Id.; see also Dodd-Frank Act § 207, 124 Stat. at 1459
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5387). § 207 is intended to incentivize boards to acquiesce and thus avoid
the need for court review of the decision to appoint the FDIC as receiver. Lee, Cross-Border
Resolution, supra note 27, at 420.
30. Lee, Cross-Border Resolution, supra note 27, at 420.
31. The district court’s review of the petition is limited to two issues: the determination that
the firm is “in default or in danger of default” and whether the firm meets the statutory definition
of a “financial company.” Id.; see also Dodd-Frank Act § 202, 124 Stat. at 1444–45 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5382). The district court does not review the determination of whether a resolution
under the Bankruptcy Code would have “serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the
U.S.” Lee, Cross-Border Resolution, supra note 27, at 420.
32. Lee, Cross-Border Resolution, supra note 27, at 420.
33. Id. at 421.
34. “Winding up” is the process of selling all the assets of a business, paying off creditors,
distributing any remaining assets to the partners or shareholders, and then dissolving the business.
Winding Up, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/windingup.asp (last visited
Aug. 16, 2018).
35. LEGAL INFO. INST., supra note 2.
36. Receivership Management Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/receivership.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).
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amasses funds from the sale of firm assets and the disposition of valid
claims that are then distributed to its creditors according to applicable law.37
Once this process is completed and all legal impediments have been
addressed, “the receivership is terminated, and a final distribution is made
to creditors.” 38 The OLA intends to safeguard the financial stability of the
U.S. economy, impose losses of the failed firm on shareholders and
creditors (not taxpayers), oust management at fault, and ensure that payouts
to claimants are the same as claimants would receive under a bankruptcy
resolution. 39
C. PRESIDENT TRUMP ORDERS REVIEW OF THE OLA AND
REPUBLICANS INTRODUCE THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT
On February 3, 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order
setting forth his Administration’s policy to regulate the U.S. financial
system in a manner consistent with seven “Core Principles.”40 On April 21,
2017, President Trump issued a presidential memorandum ordering the U.S.
Department of the Treasury (the Treasury) to review two provisions of
Dodd-Frank, including the OLA. 41 The memorandum directed the Treasury
to submit a report within 180 days, focusing on whether the OLA exposes
taxpayers to losses and encourages companies to take on more risk, and
whether a revamped bankruptcy process would be preferable.42 In addition
to the executive action taken by President Trump, Republican Congressman
Jeb Hensarling introduced the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10,
which passed in the House of Representatives and aims to repeal major
provisions of Dodd-Frank. 43 The CHOICE Act would repeal the OLA in its
entirety and proposes to replace it with an amendment 44 to the Bankruptcy
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
LEGAL INFO. INST., supra note 2.
Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965, 9965 (Feb. 3, 2017).
Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of the Treasury, Subject: Orderly Liquidation
Authority, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 201700266 (Apr. 21, 2017); Pete Schroeder, Trump Orders
Review of Financial Rules to Prevent Future Crises, REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2017, 12:33 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-regulation/trump-orders-review-of-financial-rulesto-prevent-future-crises-idUSKBN17N248. However, on November 29, 2017, the Trump
administration announced it does not plan to recommend repealing the OLA in its entirety. See
Ryan Tracy, Trump Team to Recommend Keeping Dodd-Frank Liquidation Power, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 29, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-team-to-recommend-keepingdodd-frank-liquidation-power-1511953200.
42. Schroeder, supra note 41.
43. Jeff Cox, House Passes Choice Act That Would Gut Dodd-Frank Banking Reforms, CNBC
(updated June 8, 2017, 7:09 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/08/house-has-votes-to-passchoice-act-that-would-gut-dodd-frank-banking-reforms.html; see also Financial CHOICE Act of
2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 111 (2017).
44. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§ 121–23 (2017). The CHOICE
Act incorporates provisions from the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017 (FIBA), which
was passed in the House earlier in the year. See Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017,
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Code, which, in theory, should enable large, complex financial institutions
to fail safely in a bankruptcy process without using any taxpayers funds. 45
On February 21, 2018, the Treasury issued its report to President
Trump on the OLA and bankruptcy reform (the Report).46 In contrast to the
CHOICE Act, the Report recommended retaining the OLA as an
“emergency tool for use under only extraordinary circumstances.” 47
However, similar to the CHOICE Act, the Report also recommended
significant reforms to the bankruptcy process by concurring with a proposal
put forth by the Hoover Institution to create a new Chapter 14 of the
Bankruptcy Code to handle large failing financial institutions.48 The Report
concluded unequivocally that bankruptcy should be the resolution method
of first resort. 49 While some applauded the Treasury’s attempt to work a
reasonable compromise, stern advocates of repealing the OLA expressed
disappointment. 50
H.R. 1667, 115th Cong. §§ 1181–92 (2017); Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th
Cong. §§ 121–23 (2017). FIBA and the CHOICE Act propose to amend chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code to add a new subchapter V to provide for the liquidation, reorganization, or
recapitalization of a covered financial corporation, as defined in FIBA. See Financial Institution
Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 1667, 115th Cong. §§ 1181–92 (2017); Financial CHOICE Act of
2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§ 121–23 (2017).
45. H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT, CREATING HOPE AND
OPPORTUNITY FOR INVESTORS, CONSUMERS, AND ENTREPRENEURS, A REPUBLICAN PROPOSAL
TO REFORM THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 22 (2017), https://financialservic
es.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2017-0424_financial_choice_act_of_2017_comprehensive_summary_final.pdf [hereinafter CHOICE Act
Summary].
46. See generally Dep’t of the Treas., Report to the President of the United States Pursuant to
the Presidential Memorandum Issued April 21, 2017, Orderly Liquidation Authority and
Bankruptcy Reform (Feb. 21, 2018) [hereinafter Report].
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 2–3; see generally Thomas H. Jackson, MAKING FAILURE FEASIBLE: HOW
BANKRUPTCY REFORM CAN END “TOO BIG TO FAIL” 15–58 (Kenneth E. Scott, Thomas H.
Jackson, John B. Taylor, eds., 2015) (proposing a Chapter 14 of the Bankruptcy Code for the
Recapitalization, Reorganization, or Liquidation of Large Financial Institutions).
49. Report, supra note 46, at 2.
50. Compare Christopher Beddor, Trump Hoping to Roll Back Dodd-Frank, but Treasury
Offers More Sensible Option, GLOB. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018, 9:18 PM),
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1090796.shtml (commenting that the Treasury report strikes a
balance between new bankruptcy proposals and the OLA), and Aaron D. Klein, Treasury Gets It
Right: Bankruptcy Code, Dodd-Frank Can Work Together, AM. BANKER (Feb. 28, 2018, 9:30
AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/treasury-gets-it-right-bankruptcy-code-doddfrank-can-work-together (commending the Treasury for rejecting the notion of a choice between
an amended bankruptcy scheme or the OLA), and Press Release, H.R. Judiciary Comm.,
Goodlatte and Marino Praise Treasury Report on Bankruptcy Reform (Feb. 21, 2018),
https://judiciary.house.gov/press-release/goodlatte-marino-praise-treasury-report-bankruptcyreform/ (praising the Treasury’s support for new bankruptcy legislation), with Peter J. Wallison,
The Treasury Still Needs to Bid Adios to OLA, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2018, 1:47 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-treasury-still-needs-to-bid-adios-to-ola-1520189245 (stating it
would be a mistake to keep the flawed OLA as a backstop), and Norbert Michel, Treasury
Disappoints Again on Dodd-Frank – Calls for Supporting Too Big to Fail Firms, FORBES (Feb.
26, 2018, 1:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/norbertmichel/2018/02/26/treasury-disappoints-
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II. CRITICISMS OF THE OLA AND ALTERNATIVE
BANKRUPTCY PROPOSALS
A. CRITICISMS OF THE OLA
The OLA has prompted criticism for enabling the very thing it was
meant to prevent: taxpayer-funded bailouts. 51 A key argument is that any
government-supervised resolution regime will inevitably lead to bailouts in
which taxpayer funds are at risk. 52 Instead of preventing bailouts, the OLA
institutionalizes them. 53 Critics argue that the OLA effectively gives some
firms a “too big to fail” status, which encourages them to take more risk and
necessitates government intervention if they fail. 54 This behavior presents a
moral hazard, in that individuals sheltered from the negative consequences
of precarious behavior will be tempted to take more risks. 55 Under the
OLA, once a large financial firm is placed into receivership, the FDIC can
use government funds to keep a firm running during the resolution
process. 56 Financial firms are incentivized to become “too big to fail” and to
qualify for the OLA because the market would provide them with cheaper
cost funding. 57 So long as market participants perceive that the government
will become involved in times of crisis, they will be tempted to engage in
risky behavior, which will make a crisis more likely and force the
government to “again resort to extraordinary measures to avoid it.” 58
Furthermore, adversaries argue the OLA gives “unelected bureaucrats”
broad power to overtake a faltering firm and wind it down in a manner that
unfairly pays some creditors while foisting losses on others. 59 More so, such
decisions are made “behind closed doors” and offer no way for the firm, its
creditors or the public to formally object. 60 The FDIC’s ability to treat
similarly situated creditors differently under the OLA exemplifies the cause
of such skepticism. 61 This discretion leaves market participants guessing as
again-on-dodd-frank-calls-for-supporting-too-big-to-fail-firms/#7d7c5561625a (reacting to the
Treasury Report as “puzzling and utterly disappointing”), and Press Release, H. R. Fin. Servs.
Comm., Hensarling: Treasury Report ‘Inconsistent’ With President’s Core Principle on DoddFrank Bailouts (Feb. 21, 2018), https://financialservices.house.gov/blog/?postid=403087
(expressing regret in the Treasury’s failure to recommend repeal of the OLA).
51. CHOICE Act Summary, supra note 45, at 21.
52. See MARTIN N. BAILY & DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, IN ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 165, 189–90 (Martin N. Baily et al. eds., Hoover
Institution Press 2014), http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/across-the-great-divide-ch9.pdf.
53. CHOICE Act Summary, supra note 45, at 21.
54. Schroeder, supra note 41.
55. Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate
Responsibility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761, 761 (2017).
56. See Klein, supra note 3.
57. Id.
58. CHOICE Act Summary, supra note 45, at 22.
59. Id. at 29.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 28.
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to how the FDIC may choose to resolve failing firms because the FDIC is
not required to be transparent and consistent. 62 The FDIC has also indicated
it may use a proposed “single point of entry” (SPOE) approach. 63 Under
this approach, only the parent holding company of a failed firm would be
placed in receivership, and its operating subsidiaries would be recapitalized
and kept open for business. 64 However, the SPOE approach is fairly new
and untested, and implementation of such a method could pose
challenges. 65 For example, if too many of the holding company’s assets are
transferred to various subsidiaries in advance, then no resources will be left
to fund subsidiaries that encounter unexpected distress. 66 Alternatively, if
the holding company retains its assets, then commitments of subsidiary
support may not be credible, and it will be difficult to then distribute those
assets to subsidiaries later. 67 Further, the FDIC is not required to use the
SPOE approach and may use any resolution scheme it sees fit given the
circumstances. 68 This is the very uncertainty that led to ad hoc policies and
precipitated the 2008 financial crisis.69
Another concern, and the primary reason for fear of another bailout, is
the FDIC’s authority to borrow from the Treasury’s established Orderly
Liquidation Fund (OLF) as a liquidity facility to resolve a failing firm. 70
Currently, under the OLA, “the FDIC can borrow up to 10 percent of the
book value of the failed firm’s total consolidated assets in the 30 days
immediately following its appointment as receiver.” 71 “After those 30 days,
the FDIC can borrow up to 90 percent of the fair value of the failed firm’s
total consolidated assets.” 72 Government regulators have assured the public
that taxpayer funds will not be used in such situations, and losses will be
absorbed by the private sector. 73 This means that losses should be suffered

62. Id. at 29.
63. Arthur Wilmarth, ‘Single Point of Entry’ Plan Ensures More Megabank Bailouts, AM.

BANKER (July 16, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/single-point-ofentry-plan-ensures-more-megabank-bailouts-tab-tab.
64. Id. After seizing the parent company, the FDIC would “downstream” its assets to the
subsidiaries, thereby depleting shareholder value and forcing creditors of the holding company to
suffer losses. Howell E. Jackson & Stephanie Massman, The Resolution of Distressed Financial
Conglomerates, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 48 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2912980. These steps allow the government to “resolve the entire
group without disrupting the business operations of operating subsidiaries . . . or risking systemic
consequences for the broader economy.” Id.
65. Jackson & Massman, supra note 64, at 48.
66. See id. at 48, 53–54.
67. See id.
68. CHOICE Act Summary, supra note 45, at 29.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 25; Report, supra note 46, at 1.
71. CHOICE Act Summary, supra note 45, at 25.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 24.
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by the stakeholders of the distressed firm. 74 Furthermore, regulators
promise that if funds are borrowed from the Treasury, they will be backed
by first claims on the firm’s assets, and if that is not enough, by imposing
an assessment on other large financial firms in the industry, thereby
protecting taxpayers and preventing bailouts. 75 However, the government
has issued such promises before, only to resort to taxpayer funds in times of
crisis regardless. 76 Even if healthy firms are forced to pay for the
resolutions of failed competitors, as is stipulated under the OLA, they will
simply pass these costs off to consumers in the form of higher fees for
financial products and services. 77 Moreover, this assessment is essentially
forcing responsible firms to pay for the mistakes of their reckless
counterparts, which is fundamentally unfair. 78 The mechanisms of the OLA
are institutionalizing bailouts which encourages reckless behavior in the
financial industry, such as borrowing too much money. 79 This behavior puts
taxpayers at risk of paying to protect the economy. 80
The OLA has yet to be triggered and it remains to be seen whether it
will work as designed. 81 Additionally, no case law has been developed to
assess the FDIC’s use of this power. In 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia dismissed a claim challenging the constitutionality
of the OLA for lack of standing and the absence of ripeness.82 No other
cases have addressed the use of the OLA. Unfortunately, the only way the
OLA can be tested is if another financial institution fails, the collapse of
which would have serious adverse effects on the U.S. economic system. 83
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See Bernanke, supra note 6.
Id.
CHOICE Act Summary, supra note 45, at 24.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 26.
See id. at 20–21.
See id.
Klein, supra note 3.
In State National Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2015), plaintiffs
(including a national bank, private plaintiffs, and a group of states) sued to challenge various
provisions of Dodd-Frank, one of which was the OLA. State Nat. Bank of Big Spring, 795 F.3d at
56. The plaintiffs argued that as investors in financial companies, the states were potential
creditors in possible future liquidations or reorganizations of those financial companies, and in
danger of being deprived of uniform treatment to which they are entitled to as creditors. Id.
Further, the plaintiffs argued that their current investments were worth less now because of the
danger of unfair treatment. Id. The court held it was premature to consider the legality of how the
government might use the OLA in a potential future proceeding. Id. The court also held that the
plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege or demonstrate that their current investments were worth less
now because of the government’s new orderly liquidation authority, and plaintiffs cited no
authority for such a pre-bankruptcy lawsuit. Id.
83. Bankruptcy is the preferred resolution mechanism, and the OLA is triggered only in
extreme circumstances when multiple large firms fail simultaneously and their resolution under
bankruptcy law would have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the United States.
See Paul L. Lee, The Case Against Repealing Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, THE CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (Dec. 12, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/12/12/the-case-against-repealingtitle-ii-of-the-dodd-frank-act/ [hereinafter Lee, The Case Against Repealing Title II].
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B. PROPOSALS OF THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT
AND U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT/HOOVER INSTITUTION
An alternative to the OLA has been put forth in the Republicansponsored Financial CHOICE Act, which is largely parallel to a similar
proposal by the Treasury and the Hoover Institution. 84 The fear of future
bailouts and unease regarding government secrecy has led to the belief that
resolutions of large financial institutions need to be conducted in a more
fair and transparent manner through the bankruptcy court system. 85
However, the Lehman bankruptcy showed that the Bankruptcy Code in its
present form is inadequate during an economic crisis. 86 To address such
concerns, the CHOICE Act, by incorporating provisions of the Financial
Institution Bankruptcy Act, proposes a new subchapter V within Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code to accommodate the failure of large financial
institutions. 87 Generally, firms entering bankruptcy receive a “stay,” which
prevents creditors from collecting on debts during the bankruptcy process. 88
However, the current Bankruptcy Code does not provide a stay for certain
“qualified financial contracts,” which were at the root of the financial
crisis. 89 This allows creditors to “run” 90 on financial institutions by
84. Cox, supra note 43; Report, supra note 46, at 2–3.
85. See CHOICE Act Summary, supra note 45, at 21.
86. H. Rodgin Cohen & Michael M. Wiseman, Resolving Resolution: A Path to End “Too Big

to Fail” and Taxpayer Exposure, BROOKINGS (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.brooking
s.edu/research/resolving-resolution-a-path-to-end-too-big-to-fail-and-taxpayer-exposure/.
87. Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 1667, 115th Cong. §§ 1181–92 (2017);
Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§ 121–23 (2017); CHOICE Act Summary,
supra note 45, at 28. The Hoover Institution proposal similarly suggests amending the Bankruptcy
Code to add a new Chapter 14 for the purpose of resolving large complex financial institutions.
Report, supra note 46, at 25.
88. Trey Monsour, Understanding The Automatic Stay In Bankruptcy, LAW360 (June 25,
2014, 5:25 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/551844/understanding-the-automatic-stay-inbankruptcy.
89. Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 2 n.2. Currently, the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay
does not apply to qualified financial contracts due to special “safe harbor” provisions. See Rashmi
Seth, Federal Reserve Board and FDIC Restrict Immediate Exercise of Default Rights in
Qualified Financial Contracts of GSIBs, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP (Oct. 10,
2017),
https://www.apks.com/en/perspectives/publications/2017/10/federal-reserve-board-restri
cts-immediate-exercise. “A safe harbor is a provision in a law or regulation that affords protection
from liability or penalty under specific situations or if certain conditions are met.” Jean Murray,
What is a Safe Harbor Law or Provision?, THE BALANCE (updated Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-a-safe-harbor-law-or-provision-398457. In a bankruptcy
context, “safe harbor provisions exempt . . . certain financial and derivatives contracts from
sections 362 and 365(e)(1), which, respectively, impose the automatic stay and prohibit []
enforcement to the extent those sections would prevent certain counterparties from exercising
certain contractual rights to terminate, liquidate or accelerate safe harbored contracts.” Sunny
Singh & Adam Lavine, ABI Chapter 11 Reform Commission Series: Shallow Harbors? An InDepth Look at the Proposed Changes to the Safe Harbor Provisions, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Jan.
29, 2015), https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/executory-contracts/abi-chapter-11reform-commission-series-shallow-harbors-an-in-depth-look-at-the-proposed-changes-to-the-safeharbor-provisions/.
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demanding repayments all at once, which could destroy the firm’s value
and have serious effects on the markets as a whole.91 The new subchapter
would permit a forty-eight hour stay for qualified financial contracts and
prevent creditors from taking devastating actions against the distressed
financial firms. 92 Additionally, the new subchapter provides for the use of a
“bridge company” 93 to transfer assets and liabilities of the failed firm to the
company over a “resolution weekend.”94 The viable assets of the firm are
separated from the liabilities, allowing the firm to survive until it is able to
recover and repay its debt obligations. 95 This SPOE provision, as well as
other provisions, of the proposed bankruptcy subchapter is designed to
mirror the SPOE option that already exists under the OLA. 96
Furthermore, advocates of the CHOICE Act believe that bankruptcy is
the preferred alternative to the OLA because it is “administered through the
judicial system, by impartial bankruptcy judges . . . to guarantee due
process . . . under well-settled rules and procedures.” 97 Bankruptcy utilizes
developed rules and procedures that interested parties can understand,
whereas the FDIC’s discretion under the OLA makes it unpredictable.98
Finally, the CHOICE Act requires the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court to designate “not fewer than 10 bankruptcy judges to be available to
hear a case,” who will presumably have the necessary competence to handle
90. Generally, a bank run occurs when many customers withdraw their money from a bank
simultaneously due to concerns over the bank’s insolvency. Bank Run, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bankrun.asp (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). Bank runs are
usually the result of panic rather than true insolvency; however, mass withdrawals can push the
bank to actual insolvency in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Id. Prior to the financial crisis, qualified
financial contracts were excluded from the automatic stay to permit non-defaulting counterparties
to “liquidate its contracts with the bankrupt entity immediately and minimize the ongoing risk in
the market position.” Lee, Cross-Border Resolution, supra note 27, at 412. However, after the
Lehman bankruptcy, observers noticed that this exemption inadvertently created another type of
systemic risk by fueling a wholesale “run” by non-defaulting contract counterparties. Id.
91. Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 2; Report, supra note 46, at 17–18.
92. Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 2.
93. The FDIC describes a bridge bank (or in the context of the OLA, a non-bank bridge
company) as follows:
A bridge bank is a temporary national bank chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) and organized by the FDIC to take over and maintain banking services for the
customers of a failed bank. It is designed to “bridge” the gap between the failure of a bank and the
time when the FDIC can implement a satisfactory acquisition by a third party. An important part
of the FDIC’s bank resolution process for large or complex failing bank situations, a bridge bank
provides the time the FDIC needs to take control of a failed bank’s business, stabilize the
situation, effectively market the bank’s franchise, and determine an appropriate resolution.
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 171 (1998).
The FDIC establishes the bridge bank for two years with the possibility of up to three one-year
extensions. Id. at 175.
94. Lee, The Case Against Repealing Title II, supra note 83.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. CHOICE Act Summary, supra note 45, at 29.
98. Id.
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such cases. 99 Building on the CHOICE Act proposal, the Treasury/Hoover
Institution’s Chapter 14 proposal suggests a designated set of district court
judges to preside over the case until the assets and liabilities are transferred
to the bridge company, after which “the district judge could then refer the
case to a bankruptcy judge or appoint a bankruptcy judge to assist as a
special master.” 100 Additionally, Chapter 14 provides standing for
regulators/agencies to raise and be heard on any issue in the bankruptcy
case. 101
Overall, “bankruptcy does not depend on taxpayer-provided funds to
bail out, liquidate, or reorganize a failing institution.” 102 Rather, bankruptcy
ensures that creditors and stakeholders absorb losses of a failed firm. 103
Ultimately, the goal is to eliminate implicit government guarantees, create
more market discipline, and encourage more due diligence before a large
financial institution reaches the brink of collapse. 104
III. THE CASE FOR PRESERVING THE OLA
A. MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE OLA
Many criticisms of the OLA are inaccurate and mischaracterize its
intent and function as they wrongly portray the OLA as a mechanism that
enables, rather than prevents, future bailouts. 105 The purpose of the OLA
was to “provide the necessary authority to liquidate failing financial
companies that pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United
States in a manner that mitigates such risk and minimizes moral hazard.” 106
First, it is worthwhile to note that the FDIC already possessed the power to
resolve commercial banks, and Dodd-Frank, through the OLA, expanded
this power to also cover investment banks, insurance firms, and other forms
of financial institutions.107 The primary concern is that the OLA is a “thinly
disguised, taxpayer-funded bailout.” 108 Because the FDIC can borrow funds
from the Treasury to stabilize a large failing firm, the perception is created
that the firm is “too big to fail.”109 Firms with government support will
attract investors who in turn will be more willing to lend at a greater
99. Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 1667, 115th Cong. § 298 (2017);
Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 123 (2017); Report, supra note 46, at 29–
30.
100. Report, supra note 46, at 30.
101. Id. at 28.
102. CHOICE Act Summary, supra note 45, at 29.
103. Id. at 30.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 21.
106. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 204(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1454 (2010) (codified in 12 U.S.C. § 5384).
107. See Klein, supra note 3.
108. See Bernanke, supra note 6.
109. Id.
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discount than to firms without government support and will likely have a
higher tolerance for poor decision-making or excessive risk-taking. 110
However, the OLA is not designed to be a bailout in that all costs of
resolving the firm are borne by the private sector, particularly by
shareholders, managers, and creditors. 111 Former FDIC Chairman Sheila C.
Bair said, “[t]he orderly liquidation process established under Title II of the
Dodd-Frank Act imposes the losses on shareholders and creditors, while
also protecting the economy and taxpayer interests. . . . [T]he law’s
overarching public policy objective [is] to maximize market discipline and
make clear that all equity and unsecured debt holders are at risk.” 112 The
law even expressly states that “[t]axpayers shall bear no losses from the
exercise of any authority” under the OLA. 113 Current FDIC Chairman,
Martin J. Gruenberg, also “warned against making significant changes to
Dodd-Frank reforms” and noted that the OLA is an “essential element of a
stable prudential framework.” 114 Even global banks and large financial
institutions, along with U.S. and European regulators, lobbied the Treasury
to preserve the OLA. 115 First, the “living will” provision of Dodd-Frank is
“a proactive attack on [the] ‘too big to fail’ problem.” 116 The provision
requires companies to prepare and submit a plan for a “rapid and orderly
resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure” to the Fed
and FDIC who review and decide whether to approve the plan as viable. 117
Furthermore, the resolution plan is evaluated by the Fed and the FDIC
against the Bankruptcy Code, not the OLA, reflecting legislative preference
for the Bankruptcy Code over the OLA. 118 This legislative intent reinforces
the concept that the OLA is only to be used in extraordinary circumstances
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Board Issues Proposed Rule on Claims

Process Under New Resolution Authority, F.D.I.C. PR-224-10 (Oct. 12, 2010).
113. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 214(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1518 (2010) (codified in 12 U.S.C. § 5394).
114. Steven D. Lofchie, United States: FDIC Chair Warns Against Weakening Dodd-Frank
Requirements, MONDAQ (Nov. 23, 2017),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/649132/Commodities+Derivatives+Stock+Exchanges/FDI
C+Chair+Warns+against+Weakening+DoddFrank+Requirements.
115. For instance, Jose Vinals, chairman of the British bank Standard Chartered, and one of the
industry’s most senior and influential bankers, said, “[i]t’s very important to preserve the ability of
the U.S. to have special procedures to intervene and resolve systemically important financial
institutions when there is an emergency. . . . In exceptional circumstances you need to resort to
exceptional means.” Michelle Price, Standard Chartered Chairman Urges U.S. to Preserve Bank
Resolution Regime, REUTERS UK (Oct. 12, 2017, 7:03 PM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usaiif-scb/standard-chartered-chairman-urges-u-s-to-preserve-bank-resolution-regimeidUKKBN1CH37D. Similarly, Anthony Cimino, head of government affairs at bank lobby group,
Financial Services Roundtable, stated that “large financial firms strongly support efforts to beef up
the bankruptcy code but insist that regulators must retain the OLA as an extra buffer.” Id.
116. See Bernanke, supra note 6.
117. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 1426 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
118. See Lee, The Case Against Repealing Title II, supra note 83.
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and should remain in place for that reason. 119 Another preemptive measure
is to “require that [the] large financial holding companies issue substantial
amounts of debt, with the advance understanding that this debt can be
zeroed out or converted to equity in a resolution.” 120 This debt composes
the firm’s “total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC),” 121 mitigating the risk of
a taxpayer bailout. 122
Furthermore, the purported incentive to large firms to become “too big
to fail” is contradicted by the fact that many firms have fought to avoid
being designated by the government as a “SIFI,” or a systemically
important financial institution, and do not want to be perceived as “too big
to fail.” 123 Studies have not found any “market based discounts for large,
complex financial firms as a result of the so-called ‘too big to fail’
advantage.” 124 A large firm’s ability to borrow at a lower cost than smaller
competitors can be attributable to other factors, such as: “(1) economies of
scale; (2) better access to debt markets; (3) larger dividend pay-out ratios;
and (4) credit that is less vulnerable to market disruption.” 125 Excessive
risk-taking is also attributable to other factors, such as the disconnect
between private and public interests. 126 Firms view risk-taking only from
the standpoint of the firm and its investors. 127 Therefore, firms can engage
in risk-taking ventures that have a positive expected value to their investors,
but a negative expected value to the public, because systemic harm from the
firm’s failure would be externalized onto other market participants as well
as onto the general public. 128
Republicans have also expressed uncertainty over what resolution
methods the FDIC would employ if the OLA is triggered. 129 The FDIC has
developed innovative methods of resolution planning, such as the SPOE
strategy. 130 As previously explained, the SPOE strategy would place only
the parent holding company into resolution proceedings. 131 “This approach
minimizes the complexities and conflicts that would invariably arise if
multiple resolution proceedings in the United States and foreign
119. See Cohen & Wiseman, supra note 86.
120. Bernanke, supra note 6.
121. It is currently estimated that U.S. global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) have an

aggregate total loss-absorbing capacity amount of approximately $2 trillion, which constitutes
about thirty percent of their aggregate risk-weighted assets. Report, supra note 46, at 16. This is a
significant increase from the previous loss-absorbing capacity of five percent of risk-weighted
assets. Id. at 16–17.
122. Bernanke, supra note 6.
123. See Klein, supra note 3.
124. Id.
125. Schwarcz, supra note 55, at 767.
126. See id. at 770.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. CHOICE Act Summary, supra note 45, at 29.
130. Lee, The Case Against Repealing Title II, supra note 83.
131. See id.
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jurisdictions had to be commenced at the level of the operating
subsidiaries.” 132 The SPOE approach is designed to reduce the risk of runs
on the operating subsidiaries, when depositors and other short-term
creditors of the subsidiary all request repayment of their funds
simultaneously causing the firm to become insolvent. Rather, long-term
debt (the firm’s TLAC) and equity holders absorb the losses of the firm,
avoiding the need to use taxpayer funds for another bailout. 133
Another misguided concern is over the FDIC’s authority to borrow
funds from the Treasury. 134 As a practical matter, troubled firms need cash
to maintain operations while the FDIC resolves them. 135 However, “these
loans are limited in size and are temporary funding, not permanent
capital.” 136 In contrast to the Troubled Asset Relief Program in 2008, no
provision of the OLA directs the government to inject capital into a failing
firm. 137 More so, the OLF does not represent a blank check to the FDIC.
The Treasury maintains control of any funding provided to the FDIC, and
the Secretary of the Treasury must approve each FDIC request for such
funds. 138 Any loans are required to be backed by the assets of the firm, and
the Treasury maintains priority lien positions to recover funds in the
resolution process, or from the financial industry thereafter. 139 If there is a
“net cost” after resolution of the firm, then the FDIC imposes a fee on
surviving firms to make up the difference and fully pay back the
government. 140 Furthermore, if ultimate recoveries are insufficient to repay
the temporary government liquidity support provided, the FDIC can recoup
any “‘additional payments’ or excess benefits beyond the minimum
recovery right received by creditors.” 141 The FDIC also has the authority
“to recover from any current or former senior executive or director
‘substantially responsible’ for the ‘failed condition’ of the covered financial
company any ‘compensation’ received by such person during the 2-year
period preceding the date the FDIC was appointed receiver.”142 Therefore,
other banks in the financial system, creditors, executives and shareholders

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
CHOICE Act Summary, supra note 45, at 25.
Klein, supra note 3.
Bernanke, supra note 6.
Id.
Report, supra note 46, at 9. “The Secretary sets the terms and conditions of such funding,
including the interest rate, amount and duration of the advances.” Id.
139. Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 5; Report, supra note 46, at 12.
140. Klein, supra note 3.
141. Donald S. Bernstein et al., A Creditor’s Guide to the FDIC’s Orderly Liquidation
Authority, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, 20 (Nov. 30, 2011).
142. Id. The standard of care triggering recovery is negligence (ordinarily prudent person under
similar circumstances). Id.
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pay for the bailout, not taxpayers. 143 Finally, the FDIC’s ability to treat
similarly situated creditors differently is overstated. Pursuant to 12 C.F.R. §
380.27, holders of long-term senior debt, subordinated debt or equity
interests cannot receive any additional payments that would result in those
creditors recovering more than other creditors entitled to the same priority
of payments under the law. 144 No creditor of any kind can receive any
additional payment unless the FDIC determines that the payments meet the
statutory standards. 145 Only creditors considered “essential vendors” who
provide services necessary to the continuation of the receivership are
eligible for favorable treatment. 146
Bailouts may even be more, rather than less, likely if the OLA does not
exist. 147 In the event of another crisis, if the OLA is not in place to quickly
and efficiently resolve the distressed firm, then government officials may
decide once again that a taxpayer-funded bailout is the only viable option to
protect the economy. 148 The OLA “explicitly has the financial stability of
the U.S. as its primary goal,” and uses tools such as living wills, SPOE
resolution, and other regulatory and statutory protections to accomplish this
goal. 149
B. FLAWS OF THE BANKRUPTCY ALTERNATIVE
Opponents of the OLA argue that bankruptcy should be the only
channel for resolving distressed large, complex financial firms. 150 Under
Dodd-Frank, “the [B]ankruptcy [C]ode is the first option for a failing
financial firm, leaving Title II and OLA as a last resort.” 151 Although a
bankruptcy mechanism provides another adjudication option for distressed
firms, a “full-blown crisis” is beyond a bankruptcy court’s capacities. 152

143. Bob Bryan, Here’s a Breakdown of the Republican Plan to Tear Up Wall Street
Regulations, BUS. INSIDER (May 3, 2017, 2:05 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/financialchoice-act-wall-street-regulation-bill-2017-5.
144. FDIC Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions under Title II of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 C.F.R. § 380.27(b) (2017); see also Press
Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Board Issues Proposed Rule on Claims Process Under
New Resolution Authority, F.D.I.C. PR-224-10 (Oct. 12, 2010).
145. FDIC Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions under Title II of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 C.F.R. § 380.27 (2017); see also FDIC
Board Issues Proposed Rule on Claims Process Under New Resolution Authority, F.D.I.C. PR224-10 (Oct. 12, 2010).
146. Report, supra note 46, at 33.
147. See Bernanke, supra note 6.
148. Id.
149. Elham Saeidinezhad, Orderly Resolution: Dodd Frank Versus Chapter 14, THE CLS BLUE
SKY BLOG (Mar. 24, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/03/24/orderly-resolutiondodd-frank-versus-chapter-14.
150. See Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 2.
151. Klein, supra note 3.
152. Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 2.
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Crisis management must be conducted by regulatory authorities. 153 The
CHOICE Act strips away a crucial government safeguard against systemic
collapse. 154 The OLA’s function as a regulatory backstop for any proposed
bankruptcy alternative must be retained. 155
Without the OLA, bankruptcy courts alone are faced with the task of
navigating a crisis “in ways that they have never done before.”156 Further,
the proposed CHOICE Act inadvisably makes no room for a regulatory
role. 157 Regulators are forced to watch as a firm totters, and any subsequent
actions will be too late to prevent massive losses. 158 Bankruptcy is
unaccustomed to controlling fundamental risk in this context. 159 Its focus is
on “protecting creditors, not protecting the economy, which is the priority
of the OLA.” 160
Additionally, a bankruptcy judge is not as proficient as financial
regulators in preparing for or reacting to widespread economic
catastrophe. 161 Lack of regulatory backup could fuel financial panic rather
than restore public confidence. 162 “[T]he Fed and the FDIC have extensive,
granular knowledge of the balance sheets and operations of the largest
firms.” 163 “A judge or panel of judges could not replicate this knowledge
without effectively becoming a full-fledged supervisory agency itself.” 164
Furthermore, particularly in resolutions involving global institutions, some
doubt bankruptcy judges’ ability to coordinate successfully with foreign
regulators and authorities. 165 During periods of high financial stress, there is
no assurance of foreign regulator cooperation in a U.S. judicial proceeding,
which may lead them to “ring-fence” 166 assets in their jurisdictions.167 The

153. Id.
154. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Financial CHOICE Act of 2017: Will Collective Amnesia

Triumph?, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May 22, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.c
olumbia.edu/2017/05/22/the-financial-choice-act-of-2017-will-collective-amnesia-triumph/.
155. Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 3.
156. Id. at 2.
157. Coffee, supra note 154.
158. Id.
159. Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 2.
160. Coffee, supra note 154.
161. Bernanke, supra note 6.
162. Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 2.
163. Bernanke, supra note 6.
164. Id.
165. See Lee, The Case Against Repealing Title II, supra note 83; Report, supra note 46, at 22.
166. “‘Ring-fencing’. . . refers to limitations on the transfer of funds from institutions in a host
country to their respective parent holding companies in the home country or affiliates located in
other countries . . . .” Report, supra note 46, at 22. The incentive for a host country to ring-fence is
to maximize remaining funds in the host country to cover the losses of local depositors, creditors
and other stakeholders first. Id.
167. Adam J. Levitin, Treasury’s Bankruptcy Plan Would Mean More, Not Fewer, Bailouts,
AM. BANKER (Feb. 23, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/treasurysbankruptcy-plan-would-mean-more-not-fewer-bailouts.
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elimination of the OLA may encourage such behavior. 168 Under the OLA,
“the FDIC will have prior understandings with foreign regulators,” which
will help prevent runs on foreign subsidiaries of distressed U.S. firms and
avoid “global financial contagion.” 169
Finally, the availability of liquidity is an important aspect of any
resolution process, including bankruptcy. 170 Liquidity is imperative to
“stabiliz[e]” and “maintain critical operations as the firm is restructured.” 171
Neither bankruptcy judges nor private markets can provide with certainty
the necessary liquidity to quash financial contagion.172 Bankruptcy assumes
that liquidity can be provided through debtor-in-possession financing from
the private sector; however, financing may not be available for a “large,
complex financial institution whose assets are hard to value,” particularly
with simultaneous failures across an industry. 173 While liquidity is generally
available in stable economic conditions, sources of such liquidity can
disappear altogether in a crisis. 174
Thus, liquidity funding must be available from the government, and
only the OLA provides access to such support. 175 “Public knowledge of the
availability of this [government] backstop would be essential to stabilizing
the financial system and maintaining public confidence in the American
financial structure . . . .” 176 Relying on bankruptcy as the exclusive
mechanism for resolving enormous financial institutions with global reach
is a “reckless gamble with the stability of the U.S. financial system”
considering its lack of expertise, coordination and liquidity capabilities in
times of high financial stress. 177
IV. THE BEST PATH FORWARD
The OLA should not be repealed in its entirety as it serves as an
essential backstop during a potentially catastrophic financial crisis. 178
However, amendments to both the Bankruptcy Code and the OLA will
allow both mechanisms to work more effectively during such a crisis while
reducing the risk of another taxpayer bailout. “A principal cause of both the
financial crisis of 2008 and the government’s ‘too big to fail’ response was
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Report, supra note 46, at 22.
Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 3.
See BAILY & ELLIOTT, supra note 52, at 191; see also Levitin, supra note 167.
Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 5; see Bernanke, supra note 6.
Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 5; see also Levitin, supra note 167.
Klein, supra note 3; BAILY & ELLIOT, supra note 52, at 191.
Martin N. Baily, Did Policymakers Get Post-Crisis Financial Regulation Right,
BIPARTISAN POL’Y 10 (Sept. 25, 2016), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/post-crisis-financialregulation/.
175. See BAILY & ELLIOTT, supra note 52, at 191; see also Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 5.
176. Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 5.
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282

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 13

the absence of an effective resolution framework for major financial service
companies.” 179 “[I]nconsistent approaches by government authorities for
individual companies produced confusion, perceptions of fundamental
unfairness and, ultimately, systemic consequences to the industry and the
economy, as well as taxpayer exposure.” 180 The OLA was created to avoid
repeating these mistakes, but as previously mentioned, bankruptcy is the
preferred resolution mechanism. 181 Importantly, “bankruptcy alone cannot
handle a financial crisis” resulting from the simultaneous collapse of banks
or other large, complex financial institutions. 182 On the other hand, there are
valid questions about the OLA’s lack of transparency and risk exposure to
taxpayers emanating from the use of Treasury funds. 183
Therefore, an effective approach going forward is to implement
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, as well as preserve the OLA to serve
as a safety net and last resort if bankruptcy resolution attempts fail. 184
Bankruptcy can provide the substantive and procedural provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code with which creditors are familiar and comfortable, and
the OLA can serve as backstop capable of providing crucial temporary
liquidity if a crisis escalates. 185
First, regulators must retain the authority to place a distressed financial
institution into receivership. 186 Bank executives are incentivized to resist
initiating any form of restructuring in hopes that the economy or the firm
will recover first. 187 Such a delay can be fatal in a crisis in that most of the
value of a firm’s remaining assets are destroyed before any restructuring
plan is implemented. 188 Therefore, if regulators determine there is a serious
risk of systemic collapse, the FDIC must be allowed to act swiftly and
decisively to prevent financial contagion from spreading. However, the
FDIC’s responsibility and duties should only extend to the transfer of assets
and liabilities to a bridge company and managing the bridge company until
it can be returned to private ownership. 189 From this point, adjudication of
subsequent claims against the receivership should be handled in the
transparent and fair process provided in bankruptcy court. 190
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2017),
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The urgency of a crisis should not deprive distressed firms of due
process. As explained previously, a distressed firm may force the Secretary
of the Treasury to petition the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia to appoint the FDIC as receiver for the firm. 191 The firm may
then appeal the district court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia within thirty days. 192 However, the appeal would not
stay the district court’s order authorizing the Secretary to appoint the FDIC
as receiver. 193 Therefore, the FDIC will almost certainly have already taken
substantial steps to resolve the firm before an appeal is even heard, thereby
depriving the firm of an effective remedy should the Court of Appeals
overturn the district court’s decision.194 The firm should retain a fair
opportunity to obtain meaningful relief from the Court of Appeals;
however, in an economic crisis, time is of the essence. Therefore, an appeal
should be made within three days of the district court’s decision and the
case must be heard by the Court of Appeals on an expedited basis no later
than seven days of the appeal. This will provide the firm a realistic
possibility of remedy before substantial reorganization has been carried out
by the FDIC.
Bankruptcy is the preferred mechanism for resolving distressed
financial institutions because it provides transparency and due process to all
parties involved. 195 However, the current Bankruptcy Code must be made
more robust to effectively restructure a large, complex institution. 196
Applying the automatic “stay” to qualified financial contracts, as proposed
in the CHOICE Act, is an effective starting point. 197 This will prevent
creditors from making devastating runs on the distressed firm, giving it the
necessary time to restructure and avoid complete collapse. 198 Additionally,
aspects of the SPOE strategy, such as the use of a bridge company, should
also be incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code. 199 This mechanism allows
viable assets of a company to be transferred and continue operating and
generating profits without being taken down along with the failing aspects
of the firm. 200
A Bankruptcy Code amendment should also include a provision that
allows the Fed, FDIC, or other U.S. regulators with financial expertise to be
appointed as special masters, or at least grant them standing to raise issues
and be heard in any bankruptcy proceeding involving a large, complex
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
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financial institution. 201 This would provide the courts with invaluable
financial expertise and resources to boost public confidence and ensure that
bankruptcy proceedings align with industry expectations in the United
States and abroad. 202
Even with a more robust Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy court will still
face considerable difficulty finding the necessary liquidity to facilitate
reorganization during a financial crisis. 203 The OLA is the only assured and
guaranteed source of liquidity. 204 Therefore, as part of any proposed new
bankruptcy chapter, a debtor-in-possession should be permitted to request
funding from the Treasury when it is apparent that private financing is
unavailable or insufficient. 205 In a crisis, counterparties and foreign
authorities must feel secure that the OLA will step in to provide liquidity to
prevent bank runs and ring-fencing. 206 Again, the probability that regulators
exercise this power is low considering numerous developments, including
TLAC and resolution planning (i.e., living wills) requirements, as well as
the adoption of the SPOE strategy. 207
The Report also seeks to repeal the tax-exempt status of bridge
companies formed in the resolution process, but the more practical
approach is to limit the duration of this status. 208 A newly-formed bridge
company is already burdened with priority debt obligations to the Treasury
and piling on tax obligations before market confidence is restored may
cause uncertainty about the bridge company’s ability to survive.
Alternatively, the tax-exempt status should be maintained until OLF
advances are repaid (by the firm or through an assessment on the industry),
and the firm has regained financial health.
Finally, the amount of funds the FDIC is authorized to borrow from the
Treasury causes fear of another bailout. 209 As mentioned previously, the
FDIC can initially borrow ten percent of the firm’s value, and then ninety
percent of the firm’s value after the first thirty days of receivership. 210 The
OLA requires that any borrowed funds be secured by collateral assets of the
firm, and the Treasury maintains priority lien position to be paid back
before any other creditors through the resolution process. 211 If there still
remains a “net cost” after resolution, an assessment or fee is levied on the

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Cohen & Wiseman, supra note 86; Report, supra note 46, at 28.
Cohen & Wiseman, supra note 86; see Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 3.
Gordon & Roe, supra note 4, at 5.
Id.
See Jackson, supra note 48, at 28.
See Report, supra note 46, at 31–32.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 36.
See CHOICE Act Summary, supra note 45, at 25.
Id.
Cohen & Wiseman, supra note 86.

2018]

Backstop, Not Bailout

285

other major members of the financial industry to make up the difference. 212
There is a need for the enhancement of protection to further ensure that
taxpayers are never exposed to risk. 213 Temporary liquidity is necessary
initially to keep a firm from collapsing overnight; however, once a firm has
survived this critical period, further resolution costs or losses must be
absorbed by stakeholders and creditors in the private sector. Therefore, the
FDIC should be limited in the amount of funds it can provide to a firm after
its first thirty days of receivership. Capping the amount that the FDIC can
borrow to seventy-five percent of the fair value of the failed firm’s total
consolidated assets will still provide a substantial source of liquidity, while
preventing firms from implicitly relying on unlimited government bailouts
and motivate private funding. Additionally, the ex-post assessment on the
industry is only imposed on firms with “total consolidated assets of $50
billion or more.” 214 This threshold should be reduced to firms with total
consolidated assets of $25 billion or more, which will expand the pool from
which the Treasury can recoup funds if necessary. These steps will increase
the likelihood that creditors, shareholders and the remaining private sector
absorb their share of losses before any government funds are used. If such
measures are put in place, bankruptcy and the OLA can work together to
achieve the ultimate goal of preventing another financial crisis and use of a
taxpayer-funded bailout.
CONCLUSION
The OLA should not be repealed in its entirety. It provides crucial and
necessary liquidity in times of high financial stress, as well as financial
expertise and coordination benefits that a bankruptcy court simply cannot
match. However, bankruptcy should remain the primary and preferred
resolution mechanism. The Bankruptcy Code can be made more robust by
implementing a forty-eight hour stay for qualified financial contracts and
allowing the use of bridge companies to transfer the viable operating assets
of a distressed firm to a successor entity. However, the threat of economic
catastrophe occurs only when multiple firms are in danger of failing
simultaneously. Despite a more robust Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts
are still incapable of handling a widespread economic crisis. Therefore, the
OLA must remain intact, as it serves as a backstop to be used in emergency
situations when all other resolution remedies fail. The OLA prevents
economic collapse and the use of taxpayer funds in the form of another
bailout.
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